Introduction
An extensive literature has examined interactions between government bodies and private firms. One interesting testing ground that has not been empirically explored in much depth is the patent system. Patent offices have been in existence in a wide variety of countries for well over a century, and their administrative practices today and in the past are well documented. Furthermore, the practices of these offices display a considerable degree of heterogeneity. Thus, the study of patent systems has the potential to complement the existing empirical literature, which has primarily focused on individual agencies or else on the most recent time period. This paper examines the administrative practices of patent offices in sixty countries over a 150-year period. The analysis focuses on two questions. First, the paper examines how the flexibility offered to the patent applicant and government officials varies with the extent of the economy's development. Larger countries, wealthier economies, and those where international trade is more important tend to incorporate into their patent systems features that give the applicant greater choices. These nations are also more likely to limit the discretion of the officials reviewing the patent applications, and to divide the responsibility for determining patent validity between administrators and the courts.
Second, the paper examines how these characteristics vary with the family of origin of the nation's commercial legal code. Consistent with earlier literature, civil law nations are more likely to assign the responsibility for determining legal validity solely to the courts. I also find that civil law nations are more likely to restrict the discretion of the administrator reviewing the patent applications, and to grant patent applicants greater choices.
These empirical patterns appear consistent with two stands in the economics literature. First, since Demsetz [1967] , economists have recognized that the extent of private demand for legislation will affect the willingness of governments to invest in lawmaking. Recently, Mulligan and Shleifer [2004] formally model this relationship,
showing that legislation will only be adopted when the savings that it introduces exceeds the (typically fixed) costs of implementing the change. Thus, it would not be surprising to see larger and wealthier nations-where innovation is likely to be more importantmaking greater investments into the design of an effective patent system, while other nations rely on less formal (and cheaper) ad hoc procedures. The findings regarding the greater reliance on the courts and the limits on administrative flexibility in civil law nations are consistent with the recent work on legal formalism across countries (Djankov, et al. [2003a] ).
Second, the literature on regulation has focused on information problems.
Theoretical work on regulatory economics in general (as summarized, for instance, in Laffont and Tirole [1993] and Spulber [1989] ) and patent policy in particular (especially Cornelli and Schankerman [1999] and Scotchmer [1999] ) suggests that in settings where firms have substantial private information, government officials seeking to maximize social welfare should offer companies a range of alternatives. Moreover, in settings where the danger of collusion between bureaucrats and firms is large, policymakers will seek to limit the officials' discretion. Large, complex economies might be thought to be the settings where information asymmetries between government officials and patent applicants are greatest.
In addition to being relevant for the testing of theory, this study may inform the recent debates about the harmonization of patent systems. A major focus of international bodies such as the World Intellectual Property Organization and regional groups such as the European Patent Office has been to encourage consistent patent office practices across nations. While this policy may indeed be a correct one, there has been little discussion of the need for policymakers to balance the possible costs from harmonizing these practices with the benefits.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In the second section, the relevant literature is briefly summarized. In the third section, the construction of the data set is described.
Section 4 presents the cross-sectional and regression analyses. The final section concludes the paper.
Theoretical Predictions

A. Insights from the New Comparative Economics
Economists have recognized at least since the work of Demsetz [1967] that the demand side is a critical determinant of the extent of legal regimes. This insight is formalized in Mulligan and Shleifer [2004] , who present a model of the creation of new legal strictures. They argue that there is likely to be a fixed cost associated with setting up and implementing a new legal or regulatory regime. Nations and states are likely to differ in the extent to which they will benefit from such a shift. As a result, legislators are likely to only adopt a new law only if the savings from formalizing the legal regime exceed the costs of designing and implementing the regulation. They suggest this will lead to more populous political entities adopting more detailed policies. Similarly, political entities where a given activity is more important (to cite one of their examples, mining in West Virginia) are likely to adopt laws governing that activity.
Turning to patent law, it might be anticipated that nations where innovative activity is extensive should be more likely to have well-delineated patent laws. In particular, it is reasonable to anticipate that nations where innovations are more frequent-whether because the population is larger or the economy is better developedare likely to find it worthwhile to invest in complex legal features such as giving patent applicants a menu of options to choose from. In nations where innovations are less important, differences in the importance of patented discoveries may be addressed not by formal regimes, but rather by simply giving government officials the freedom to adjust awards as they deem appropriate.
Another related body of work concerns procedural formalism: the number and nature of distinct steps before which a dispute between two parties can be formally resolved. Djankov, et al. [2003a] document that an index of formalism is distinctly higher in nations with a civil law legal tradition, especially those with a French legal origin. Moreover, greater formalism is associated with lengthier disputes, lower contractual efficiency, and greater corruption, even after controlling for the fact that judicial systems work more poorly in less developed nations. Djankov, et al. [2003b] presents a model in which less developed nations, by emulating the legal choices of their colonial parents, end up with systems that are excessively formalistic. These patterns lead me to anticipate that civil law nations will have a greater role for the judicial system in patent administration, and more extensive restrictions on the flexibility of administrators.
B. Insights from Regulatory Economics
In the early 1980s, the importance of private information on the part of firms in shaping the institutional features of government agencies was appreciated. One insight of the "New Regulatory Economics" (e.g., Laffont and Tirole [1986] , Lewis and Sappington [1989] ) is that these information problems between firms and regulators can be overcome if the regulator offers a menu of contracts. Even if the regulator cannot observe the differences between companies, he may design a range of alternatives that can discriminate between firms of different quality.
A parallel literature, beginning with Wright [1983] , has examined how information problems affect the patent system and how they can be overcome. These works highlight that the patent system is an outgrowth of the presence of information asymmetries between patentees and the government. Were there no information gaps, the government could simply subsidize innovative firms and place the inventions in the public domain. Patent awards, by linking the size of the award (the patentee's monopoly profits) to the patentee's private information (the importance of the innovation) can address this information problem. But as Wright and subsequent authors (Scotchmer and Green [1990] , Kremer [1998] ) point out, patent awards can have a wide variety of deleterious consequences, such as the social loss from monopoly pricing. Cornelli and Schankerman [1999] and Scotchmer [1999] highlight how information asymmetries between inventors and patent officials can be overcome if the government offers a menu of patents of different lengths. Under certain conditions, the authors show that a renewal fee mechanism-whereby patentees must pay to periodically renew their patent awardscan induce the optimal (or close to the optimal) level of investment in innovation.
Simulations by Cornelli and Schankerman suggest that as the dispersion in company types rises (and hence the information gap between the firm and the government increases), the menu of patent lives that firms can choose from should increase.
A related body of work has focused on managing government officials who interact frequently with industry. Because of the information asymmetries between agency officials and their political overseers, government officials can engage in a variety of self-benefiting behaviors. One response is to limit the discretion of the bureaucrats.
Economists (Laffont and Tirole [1993], Laffont [1994] ) have shown that legislators respond to such information asymmetries by limiting the discretion of agencies. Even if the agency has private information that would allow it to effectively discriminate between firms, the need to limit collusion may lead policymakers to restrict its use of that information. A second response is to divide the responsibility for a single regulatory function between agencies or branches of government. By having multiple regulators, each of whom has information that is only partially known by the others, the ability of regulators to collude with firms may be greatly reduced (Landes and Posner [1975] , Laffont and Martimort [1999] ).
This literature suggests examining how the discretion granted patent office officials varies with the information environment. I speculate that in larger, wealthier, and more globally integrated economies, these sorts of information problems are greater.
In these cases, patent applicants may more frequently encounter choices, such as the option to pay for patents in stages. In addition, limitations on the discretion of patent office administrators may be more common. Finally, these nations may be more likely to divide the responsibility of determining whether patents are valid between the patent office and the courts.
The Construction of the Data Set
I employ as my sample the sixty countries listed in the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics as having the highest gross domestic product (GDP) in 1997. If the country was missing GDP data for 1997, I use the GDP and exchange rate for the most recent year for which such data were available, inflation adjusting the result to insure comparability. 1 1 In one case (Iraq), the volume had no data for the past five years. In this case, a consensus estimate from press accounts was used. In the second case (Taiwan), a country was not listed due to questions about its political status. In this case, data were obtained from government publications.
I then determine the features of the patent system at 25-year intervals. I seek to determine this information as of mid-year 1850, 1875, 1900, 1925, 1950, 1975, and 1999. I only determine the status of the country's patent system if it was an independent political entity as of that date. My rationale for this approach is that most colonies did not have independent patent policies. Most did not grant patents at all, simply registered patents granted by their colonial overseer without any formal review, or had patent systems that closely mirrored those of their colonizer. As a result of these omissions, this sample is not balanced: the number of observations increased over time, as more nations
Determining what constituted an independent country is not always a simple matter. In some cases, colonies underwent prolonged independence struggles, and the exact date at which an independent government was established is difficult to determine (e.g., Saudi Arabia and Indonesia). In other cases, countries enjoyed a great deal of independence while under the official control or informal influence of another nation (e.g., Norway and Korea in the nineteenth century, Egypt in the 1930s and 1940s). In general, I seek to include a nation from the date that its independence was declared (conditional on it eventually emerging as a widely recognized country). 2 2 Two complications should be briefly discussed. First, an exception to the algorithm above is made for formerly independent countries that were the final stages of military occupation (e.g., West Germany in 1950). In many instances, independent patent systems had been adopted as a prelude to the relinquishment of military oversight. Second, in cases where a country was divided into several political entities, I use the patent policy (and other characteristics discussed below) from the most economically significant portion. For instance, in the case of Germany, I use Prussia's patent policy prior to German unification, and that of West Germany after World War II.
In order to undertake this analysis, I rely on guidebooks to the world patent systems. These handbooks been frequently published since the early nineteenth century. I employ six measures:
• The size of the economy, as measured by its population (available for 99% of the 298 country-year observations).
• The per capita gross domestic product. The variable was converted into current U.S. dollars using, if possible, a purchasing power parity-based exchange rate. It was then converted into 1998 dollars using the U.S. GDP deflator (back to 1889) or the U.S. consumer price index (for earlier years). (This was available for 91% of the observations).
• The extent to which the economy was self-contained, or shaped by interactions with foreign markets. To compute this, I used the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to gross domestic product (92%).
• The percentage of population employed in agriculture, calculated where possible using data on the civilian workforce only (81%).
• The percentage of population with basic literacy skills, defined by the United Nations Demographic Yearbook (the original source of most of the post-World War II data) as the "the ability both to read and to write." This measure was likely to be quite imprecise, particularly during older periods and in developing nations (71%).
• The family into which the nation's commercial laws fell, employing the classification in La Porta, et al. [1999] (100%).
Many of the variables, especially the demographic ones, must be approached with caution. Definitions were unlikely to be consistent across countries and time, and nations may have been tempted to give an excessively positive view of their progress. Despite these substantial limitations, these variables can provide a general sense of the nations' development.
I seek to match the date of these measures as closely as possible to that of the patent policy observation, using the same month or calendar year. For the nineteenth century, however, I relax these requirements: I employ an observation as long as it was within five years of the period at which patent policy was recorded. This is particularly true of the estimates of GDP, which were only periodically available.
Empirical Analysis
A. Summary Statistics
The first four tables provide an overview of the measures of patent office practice used in the analysis. The first two tables focus on the discretion delegated to patent applicants; the third examines flexibility provided patent office officials; and the fourth looks at the extent to which the determination of patent validity was left to the courts, or divided between judges and patent officials.
The first table focuses on one of the most important forms of discretion granted the patentee in many countries, the right to renew patents. As Schankerman and Pakes [1986] argue, allowing patentees to pay for only the first year (or years) of patent protection and then to renew the awards if commercially important provides them with a potentially valuable option. Because there were often a series of renewal fees of different magnitudes, summarizing the option-like nature of patent awards was complex. The table presents two ways to do so. The simplest is the count of the number of renewal fees due. Those nations with more renewal fee payments offer applicants more opportunities to cease making payments if the patent subsequently proves to be unattractive. (In making this calculation and the one below, I assume that the patent was held for the longest period regularly granted, without any provision for discretionary extensions due to extraordinary circumstances. 4 ) Second, I present the ratio of fees due in the second half of the patent's life to that of the first half. The calculation can be seen as approximating the ratio of the exercise price to the purchase price of the option.
The second table examines other forms of discretion provided to the patentee.
The number in each cell is the years from the application date that an applicant could delay having one of his patents examined. In recent years, many counties have allowed innovators to file patent applications that remain unexamined until requested. This provided a potentially important option, as firms could cheaply file large numbers of 4 The period used was the time from the original application date to the end of the award. One complication was introduced by the practice of some countries of calculating the duration of patents from the date of the award or publication, rather than the date of the application. In these instances, I make some broad assumptions based on practitioner discussions. In particular, I assume that that in 1850 and 1875, there was virtually no gap between the application and the award. In 1900 and 1925, I assume that patents were awarded (and published) one year after the application date. In 1950 and thereafter, I assume that patents were published one year after and awarded two years after the application date. In making the fee calculation, I count payments happening on the midpoint date as being in the second half. Thus, in a country that awarded patents for twenty years from the application date, I divide the renewal fees paid from the tenth anniversary of the application onwards by the application, award, and renewal fees paid beforehand.
applications for technologies that might ultimately prove to be of strategic importance.
(For a discussion of how firms in Japan exploited this option, see U.S. General
Accounting Office [1993] .) The footnotes to the table denote a variety of other forms of discretion granted applicants. These included whether there was any provision for alternative patent awards. These fall into three categories: patents of addition (typically low-cost awards designed to supplement existing patent awards which expire with the original award), preliminary patent applications (which enable an inventor to establish priority rights, even if he has not yet prepared a full-fledged patent application), and most importantly, "utility model" patents. Utility model patents frequently run for a reduced duration and involve a narrower scope of protection.
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The third table summarizes a variety of ways in which the government officials exercised discretion over patent awards. The table tabulates the number of years that patent office administrators could extend the length of a patent. (Since the structure of patent awards was in almost all cases a consequence of legislative statute or royal decree rather than a constitutional mandate, I do not include cases where the duration of the patent could only be extended through legislation or royal grant.) The footnotes indicate whether patent officials had any of five forms of discretion. These included the right to choose which patents to examine, to vary the fee charged the patentee, to alter the period in which the patent had to be put into practice ("worked"), to license or revoke all or some of awards (only included when licensing or revocation was possible for reasons other than the failure to put the patent into practice in a specified time), 6 and to determine the original inventor (rather than being constrained to award the patent to the first applicant).
The final set of measures, summarized in Table 4 , focus on the examination process. The table notes whether the patents were examined by patent office officials for novelty in all, some, or no cases. As alluded to above, in some cases government officials made the initial determination of the validity of the awards; in others, these considerations were left entirely to the courts. It also indicates whether the office adjudicated objections to the validity of the proposed patent (termed oppositions) filed by rivals prior to patent awards. • The number of renewal fees required. Each such juncture allows the patent-holder an opportunity to cease paying, and to instead relinquish any further protection.
• The ratio of fees paid in the second half of the patent's life to those paid in the first half, calculated as described above.
• Whether the nation offers minor, or utility model, patents, as an alternative to larger awards.
• The number of years that an applicant can request the examination of a patent be delayed for.
• The number of years that patent office administrators can extent a patent's life without legislative or other action.
• Whether patent office officials examine the novelty of patent applications before granting awards. In nations with examination systems, the courts can in virtually every case review these determinations, so the responsibility for determining validity is divided between these two bodies. In the other countries, the determination of whether the patent is novel is left entirely to the courts.
Wealthier and larger economies were more likely to provide the patentees with greater flexibility, as seen in the more frequent renewals, steeply rising renewal fee schedules, more frequent use of utility patents, and provisions to delay patent examinations for longer periods. Meanwhile, the flexibility of the patent office to extend patent awards was significantly lower in these instances. 8 In addition, the patent office was more likely to conduct novelty examinations in wealthier economies. The patterns held true as well-though in some cases, to a less dramatic extent-when other proxies for economic development were examined: an important role for foreign trade, a nonagrarian society, and a population with a high literacy rate.
8 One complication was introduced by cases where the patent officials' discretion to extend patents was not limited to a set number of years. In this table, I assume that the awards in these cases could be extended by a period equal to the longest period that was statutorily specified for patent extensions in any country (twenty years).
There were also significant differences between common and civil law nations, as well as between these nations and the others. Civil law nations were significantly more likely to grant patent applicants discretion in two cases: they had more renewals and offered utility patents more often. Civil law nations were also far less likely to allow patent office administrators the ability of extend patent awards, and tended to place the sole responsibility for determining patent quality in the hands of the courts.
The univariate nature of these comparisons means that I must be cautious in interpreting them. But it is worth pausing to point out that both sets of findings are consistent with the literature identified in Section 2. First, the findings regarding the differences with economic development can be interpreted in two ways. Nations where innovative activities are more central to economic growth may be more willing to invest in developing a costly patent system that is best suited to meet their needs. For instance, the costs of running a renewal fee system are not trivial. Only if innovation is sufficiently important in the economy will this investment be made. Alternatively, the greater discretion afforded patent applicants and the reduced freedom patent office administrators had in these countries may reflect the greater information asymmetries here. Second, the greater reliance on the courts to determine patent novelty and the reduced discretion allowed patent administrators in civil law nations is consistent with the literature on formalism.
B. Regression Analyses
I then examine patent office practice in a regression framework, beginning with the options available to patent applicants.
Patent Applicants' Options
I first consider the nature of patent renewals. As in Table 1 , I examine the number of renewal fees due over the patent's life and the ratio of the fees paid in the second half of the patent's life to those paid in the first half. Reflecting the ordinal, nonnegative character of the former variable, I employ a Poisson specification. In the latter, I
use an ordinary least squares specification.
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As independent variables in these regressions (and the ones that follow), I use the measures included in the cross-tabulations in Table 5 . These are the per capita gross domestic product, the national population, the ratio of exports and imports to GDP, dummies denoting common and civil law countries, the share of the civilian population working in agriculture, and the national literacy rate. Because the last two variables are somewhat less complete than the others, I first estimate the regressions without them, and then with each of these variables in turn.
As Table 6 reports, patentees faced more frequent renewal fees and a more steeply sloped fee schedule and as the national economies became larger. In addition, wealthier nations and more trade-intensive economies were often, though not as consistently, associated with the provision of greater discretion to the patentee.
Furthermore, common law countries were significantly less likely (at least at the tenpercent confidence level) to offer patentees these options than were civil law nations.
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These effects were significant economically as well as statistically. For instance, in the fourth regression a one standard deviation increase in the national population led to the fee ratio increasing by 51%; a one standard deviation increase in the ratio of exports and imports to GDP led to an increase of 29%. A switch from a common to a civil commercial code was associated a 64% increase. These changes were substantial relative to the mean ratio in the sample, 209%.
The use of other mechanisms to provide the patentee with discretion presented a generally consistent, though more mixed, pattern. In Table 7 , I examine two measures of discretion granted patent applicants. The first measure is whether the most important alternative form of patent protection, the utility model patent, was offered as an option.
The second is the extent to which the applicants could delay the examination of a patent.
As discussed above, these provisions allowed innovators to file large number of low-cost applications, which then could be activated if the technologies subsequently proved to be valuable. In the former case, I employed a logit specification, while in the latter, I used a Tobit approach (in many nations, no extensions are possible).
The analysis of the use of utility model patents is largely consistent with the findings in Table 6 . First, larger nations with more international trade, less agriculture, and higher literacy rates were more likely to offer such an option to patent applicants.
(The one discordant note is in the third regression in Table 7 , where per capita GDP proves to be significantly negative.) Second, common law nations were significantly less likely to offer this option to applicants than civil law nations.
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The second analysis in Table 7 is also generally consistent with the patent renewal regressions discussed above. Greater discretion was granted to the patent applicant as the economy became larger and more complex. Delayed examinations were more frequent in countries with larger populations, more foreign trade, a smaller agricultural workforce, and greater literacy. (Per capita GDP was significant only in one regression.) No significant differences appeared, however, between the common and civil law nations.
Taken together, the results in this section are consistent with the discussion in Section 2. The more extensive options offered patent applicants in larger and wealthier firms may be a response to the greater importance of innovation in these economies, as Mulligan and Shleifer [2004] suggest. In addition, it may be a response to the greater information gaps between patent applicants and the patent office in these nations.
11 An analysis of a second form of alternative patents discussed in Table 2 , preliminary awards, is very consistent with that of utility model patents. A third form of alternative patent protection, however, displays a different pattern: patents of addition were more frequent in poorer countries. Conversations with legal scholars suggest that these awards were generally of highly limited scope, which suggests the focus on utility model patents is appropriate.
The greater use of options for patent applicants in civil law countries is somewhat more challenging to interpret. As noted above, civil law nations have been shown to more frequently employ formal procedures to resolve disputes between parties. The greater utilization of formal options for patent applicants could be seen as being consistent with this general pattern. As will be highlighted below, this finding raises questions that deserve further exploration.
Discretion Granted the Patent Office
I then consider the discretion granted to patent office officials. As in Table 3, I examine this in two ways. First, I measure the number of years patent office officials could extend awards. I employ a censored regression specification. 12 Second, I count the other forms of discretion sometimes granted these officials. In particular, I create an index that tabulates how many of five frequently encountered forms of discretion the patent officials have:
• The right to choose which patents to examine before they are issued, rather than (for instance) being required to examine all or none of the applications.
• The right to determine how long the patent awardee has to put the patent into practice. If the patentee failed to work the award, the patent could frequently be revoked or compulsorily licensed to others.
• The right to charge different fees to different patent applicants at the office's discretion.
• The right to license or revoke the patent for reasons other failing to work the award.
• In case of disputes about who made a discovery, the right to determine who did so on a subjective basis, rather than relying mechanically on who filed the first application.
Thus, the dependent variable takes on a value between zero (when none of these forms of discretion were available to the patent office) to five (were all were). In this case, I
employ an ordered logit specification.
The results in Table 8 show that in more larger and complex economies, the discretion of patent officials was considerably reduced. The population was significantly negative in all of the patent life extension regressions; the GDP and trade measures in at least one of the regressions. In the regression explaining other forms of patent office discretion, only the foreign trade measure was significantly negative. Throughout the regressions, the differences between common and civil law countries were highly statistically significant: common law nations were much more likely to grant patent office officials discretion to adjust the term and nature of awards.
I also analyze the patent examination process. As discussed above, in many economies the determination of patent validity was left solely in the hands of the judicial system; elsewhere, it was divided between the patent office and the judiciary.
In the regressions reported in Table 9 , I employ a qualitative dependent variable:
whether the patent office had no role in determining patent novelty (coded as zero), whether it had some role (one), or whether it provided full-fledged novelty examinations for all patent applications (two). In the middle category, I include cases where the patent office examined some but not all applications, as well as those instances where the office did not examine applications for novelty but reviewed oppositions brought by rivals of the patent applicant.
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Larger and wealthier nations, as well as those with lower agricultural employment and a higher literacy rate, were more likely to have both patent officials and judges involved in determining patent novelty. Civil law countries were far less likely to do so, being inclined to assign the responsibility of determining patent novelty solely to the courts.
These results can be seen as largely complementary to the literature discussed in Section 2. First, consider the results regarding the nation's size and development.
Nations where innovation is more important may be willing to invest in a highly complex patent adjudication system, incorporating such features as joint reviews by the patent office and the judiciary, because it is critical to have this aspect of the government working correctly. As a result, ad hoc procedures such as giving patent officials the ability to revoke awards may not be needed. Alternatively, the greater informational asymmetries between patent office administrators and government officials in these economies may necessitate the reduction of the office's discretion.
Second, consider the findings regarding the differences between civil and common law countries. Civil law nations have been shown to rely more heavily on 13 In unreported regressions, I run the analysis with a dummy variable coded as one if the patent office examined all applications for novelty and zero otherwise. The results are consistent with those reported. I also estimate the regressions treating in different ways observations where patent applications were published prior to being issued, but where there was no formal opposition or examination procedure. These modifications also had little effect.
formal proceedings to resolve commercial disputes. Thus, the greater role of the courts in determining patent novelty and the reduced discretion of patent office administrators are consistent with the literature on formalism.
Conclusions
The presence of patent offices for an extended period in a wide variety of countries suggests that this is an attractive arena in which to empirically examine the design of administrative procedures. In larger nations with more complex economies, patentees were more likely to have more options, being able to delay the bulk of the payments until later in patents' lives, to apply for alternative utility model patents, and to delay the examination of patent applications. Meanwhile, patent officials were less likely to be granted discretion to extend and otherwise modify awards in these settings.
Responsibility for determining patent validity was more likely to be divided between the patent office and the judicial system.
Similarly, substantial differences appeared between civil and common law nations. In civil law nations, the courts played a more important role in resolving whether patents were novel, and the flexibility of patent office administrators was more circumscribed. Patent applicants in civil law countries had greater choices regarding the nature of their filings. The evidence presented in this paper is broadly consistent with the literature discussed in Section 2.
The analysis suggests a variety of topics for further investigation. One of the most interesting set of issues is how the nature of patent office practice affects the innovation process. The literature on legal formalism suggests that the nature of the rules governing disputes can have profound consequences for behavior. In particular, the evidence presented in Djankov, et al. [2003a] suggests that excessive formalism can have a profoundly distorting effect on the economy. Have firms adjusted their patenting and R&D decisions in each country in response to the administrative schemes of the patent office?
Second, the finding that civil law nations offer greater choices to patent applicants -e.g., the ability to delay payments for patents and to select alternative forms of patent protection-is intriguing. One possible interpretation is that such options help firms, compensating (at least in part) for the deleterious effects of the high levels of formalism found in the patent systems of civil law nations. It would be interesting to see if similar features are embodied elsewhere in the legal systems of these nations. NA 145%**** Argentina 33%**** 40%**** 49%**** 52%**** 36%**** 98%**** Australia 63%* 234%**** 169%**** 236%**** Austria 55%**** 0% 544%**** 881%**** 552%**** 769%**** 466%**** Bangladesh NA 370%**** Belgium 0%* 280%**** 282%**** 295%**** 361%**** 365%**** 303%**** Brazil 0% 0% 286%**** 222%**** 89%**** 0%** 192%**** Canada 50%** 50%** 0% 0% 0% 146%**** Chile 0% 0% 0% 0% 99%** 50%** 0% China 510%**** Columbia 0% 0% 0% 0% NA NA 58%** Czech Republic 544%**** 529%**** 70%**** 330%**** Denmark 0% 493%**** 436%**** 331%**** 230%**** 195%**** Egypt 187%**** 156%**** Finland 364%**** 373%**** 297%**** 317%**** France 88%**** 88%**** 88%**** 154%**** 217%**** 141%**** 218%**** Germany 0% 0% 233%**** 771%**** 793%**** 788%**** 661%**** Greece 233%**** 155%**** 173%**** 291%**** Hungary 507%**** 748%**** 281%**** 194%**** India 404%**** 327%**** 818%**** Indonesia 344%**** Iran NA 152%**** 146%**** Iraq NA NA 141%**** Ireland 287%**** 327%**** 205%**** Israel 188%*** 221%**** 356%*** Italy 100%* 133%**** 133%**** 219%**** 323%**** 322%**** 564%**** Japan 216%**** 226%**** 508%**** 345%**** 751%**** Kuwait NA 0% Libya NA 0% Malaysia 278%**** Mexico 0% 0% 109%*** 109%**** 106%**** 106%**** 103%**** Morocco NA 151%**** Myanmar Netherlands 0% 188%**** 189%**** 151%**** 231%**** New Zealand 0%** 135%*** 146%*** 162%*** Nigeria NA 0% Norway 0% 0% 205%**** 395%**** 305%**** 267%**** 246%**** Pakistan 385%**** 385%**** 375%**** Peru 0% 111%**** 0% NA 682%* NA Philippines NA 150%**** 150%**** Poland 461%**** 378%**** 183%**** 232%**** Portugal 0% 88%**** 0% 114%**** 105%**** 72%**** 225%**** Romania 224%**** 0% 193%**** 174%**** Russia 0% 0% 357%**** 327%**** 109%**** 296%**** Saudi Arabia 107%**** Singapore 153%**** South Africa 178%*** 124%**** 114%**** 100%**** South Korea NA NA 841%**** Spain 0% 0% 282%**** 341%**** 446%**** 351%**** 353%**** Sweden 0% 0% 176%**** 250%**** 343%**** 243%**** 226%**** Switzerland 198%**** 198%**** 198%**** 425%**** 99%**** Syria NA NA 150%**** Taiwan NA NA 354%**** Thailand 884%**** Turkey 88%**** 88%**** 169%**** 95%**** 93%**** Ukraine 239%**** United Arab Emirates NA United Kingdom 0% 133%** 467%**** 333%**** 313%**** 260%**** 276%**** United States 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 60%*** Venezuela 0% 0% NA 149%**** NA Notes: * = One renewal fee. ** = Two renewal fees. *** = Three to five renewal fees **** = Six or more renewal fees. NA = No data on patent fees are available.
I compute the ratio of the total cost incurred during the last half of the period from patent application to the expiration of the award (with no provisions for discretionary extensions) to the cost in the first half. For 1950 and afterwards, it is assumed that awards occur two years after the application date (one year after publication date). For 1900 and 1925, it is assumed awards occur one year after the application date (and publication date). For 1850 and 1875, it is assumed awards occur only a nominal period after application. Indef. = No legislative limits on the period for which the government can extend a patent award. E = Government has discretion over which patent applications to examine. F = Government can vary fee charged patentee. L = Government has power to license or revoke patents for reasons other than non-working. Ls = Government has power to license or revoke some patents for reasons other than non-working (typically pharmaceutical patents). P = Government can determine the original inventor (rather than being constrained to award patent to the first applicant). W = Government has discretion over working period that is designated. In some cases when there is no regular examination for novelty, the applicant can request that the patent office undertake such a search. * = Significant at the 10% confidence level; ** = 5% confidence level; *** = 1% confidence level. * = Significant at the 10% confidence level; ** = 5% confidence level; *** = 1% confidence level. Table 8 . Discretion granted to the patent office. The sample consists of the sixty largest countries (by gross domestic product) at the end of 1997, observed at 25-year intervals from 1850 to 1999. The dependent variable in the first three regressions is the maximum period (in years) that the government officials can extend a domestic patent award without legislative action. Because in some cases the length of extension is discretionary, a censored regression is run with the maximum length being twenty years or greater. The dependent variable in the fourth through sixth regressions is the count of how many of five commonly encountered forms of discretion granted to patent office officials (choosing which patents to examine, determining the working period, setting fees, ascertaining whether to license or revoke patents for reasons other than non-working, and determining the inventor based on criteria other than the filing date) are present. Countries with systems of registering patents granted in other nations or without an independent patent system are not included in any of the regressions. Independent variables are the level of the country's per capita gross domestic product (in thousands of 1998 U.S. dollars), the country's population (in millions), the ratio of exports plus imports to gross domestic product, dummy variables for the family of origin of the country's commercial legal code, the share of civilian employment in agriculture, and the national literacy rate. The first three regressions employ a censored regression specification; the fourth through sixth, an ordered logit specification. Standard errors in brackets. * = Significant at the 10% confidence level; ** = 5% confidence level; *** = 1% confidence level.
The patent life extension measure does not include cases where pharmaceutical patents are extended by a formula based on the duration of regulatory approval process. * = Significant at the 10% confidence level; ** = 5% confidence level; *** = 1% confidence level.
In cases when there is no regular examination for novelty, but the applicant can request that the patent office undertake such a search, the patent office is not coded as having examination power.
